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This article broaches the thorny issue of how we may study the history of the CIA by
utilizing oral history interviews. This article argues that while oral history interviews
impose particular demands upon the researcher, they are particularly pronounced in
relation to studying the history of intelligence services. This article, nevertheless, also
argues that while intelligence history and oral history each harbour their own episte-
mological perils and biases, pitfalls which may in fact be pronounced when they are
conjoined, the relationship between them may nevertheless be a productive one. Indeed,
each field may enrich the other provided we have thought carefully about the linkages
between them: this article’s point of departure. The first part of this article outlines some
of the problems encountered in studying the CIA by relating them to the author’s own
work. This involved researching the CIA’s role in US foreign policy towards Afghani-
stan since a landmark year in the history of the late Cold War, 1979 (i.e. the year the
Soviet Union invaded that country). The second part of this article then considers some
of the issues historians must confront when applying oral history to the study of the
CIA. To bring this within the sphere of cognition of the reader the author recounts some
of his own experiences interviewing CIA officers in and around Washington DC. The
third part then looks at some of the contributions oral history in particular can make
towards a better understanding of the history of intelligence services and the CIA.
For now we see through a glass darkly;
but then face-to-face: now I know in part.
1 Corinthians, 13:12
Studying history, it has been said, may be compared to viewing theChâteau de Versailles by looking through the keyholes. Someparts seem clear to us; some are fragmentary, opaque and hard to
decipher; while others remain totally invisible and beyond reach.
Whereas it originated with the study of the ancient world, the metaphor
is particularly apt with reference to the study of a much more modern
institution which in turn is embedded within a much more contempo-
raneous culture: the US Central Intelligence Agency.
Although intelligence has remained the subject of much popular and
journalistic titillation, not to mention an ever-increasing number of
memoirs and exposes,1 the academic study of the subject has seen a
1 See for example: Philip Agee, Inside the Company: CIA Diary (New York, 1975); Duane R.
Clarridge, A Spy for All Seasons: My Life in the CIA (New York, 1997); Richard Helms, A Look
Over My Shoulder: A Life in the CIA (New York, 2003); Frank Snepp, Decent Interval: An Insider’s
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steady upswing over a number of years on both sides of the Atlantic.
Scholars have constructed an impressive body of scholarship and
have been exploring inter alia: intelligence services, intelligence leaders,
covert action, intelligence collection and analysis, and the ethics of
intelligence.2 Indeed, a disproportionate share of the output in ‘the
Anglosphere’ has focused upon the United States and the CIA more
particularly.3 Nevertheless, certain omissions and blind-spots remain.
This article broaches the thorny issue of how we may study the CIA
by utilizing oral history interviews. While the study of intelligence poses
an especial set of challenges for the historian, of which more below, the
application of oral history to an intelligence agency adds yet another
layer of methodological and epistemological intricacy – one which must
be carefully negotiated. Consequently, this article argues that while oral
history interviews impose particular demands upon the researcher, they
are nevertheless particularly pronounced in relation to studying intelli-
gence history and the CIA in particular. This article also argues,
however, that while intelligence history and oral history each harbour
their own metatheoretical perils and biases, pitfalls which may in fact
may exacerbated when they are conjoined, the relationship between
them may in fact be a productive, generative one. Indeed, they may
inform each other’s problematic, provided we have carefully thought
through the linkages between them – in many ways this article’s point of
departure. Based on the author’s own experiences conducting oral
history interviews with CIA officers, therefore, this article sets out some
of the ways in which we may think about the relationship between
intelligence history and the equally burgeoning field of oral history.
This analysis, to be sure, arises out of a broader intellectual context.
History and politics traditionally conceived have been about states, the
machinery of government, the paper trail left by elites, and ‘great men’.
As Paul Thompson pointed out in his seminal The Voice of the Past:
Oral History: ‘the very power structure worked as a great recording
Account of Saigon’s Indecent End Told by the CIA’s Chief Strategy Analyst in Vietnam (New York,
1977); George Tenet, At the Centre of the Storm: My Years at the CIA (New York, 2007).
2 Richard J. Aldrich, The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence
(London, 2001); Christopher Andrew, The Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5
(London, 2010); Ross Bellaby, Ethics and Intelligence Collection: A New Framework (London,
2014); Gary Bernsten, Jawbreaker: The Attack on Bin Laden and Al Qaeda (New York, 2006);
Sarah-Jane Corke, US Covert Operations and Cold War Strategy: Truman, Secret Warfare and the
CIA, 1947–53 (London, 2008); Keith Jeffery, MI6: The History of the Secret Intelligence Service
1909–1949 (London, 2011); Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, The CIA and American Democracy, 2nd edn
(New Haven, 1989); George O’Toole, Honourable Treachery: A History of U.S. Intelligence, Espio-
nage, and Covert Action from the American Revolution to the CIA (New York, 1991); David
Omand, Securing the State (London, 2012); Joseph E. Persico, Casey: From the OSS to the CIA
(New York, 1990); John Prados, Lost Crusader: The Secret Wars of CIA Director William Colby
(New York, 2003); Mark Phythian, Understanding the Intelligence Cycle (London, 2013); Gary
Schroen, First in: How Seven CIA Officers Opened the War on Terror in Afghanistan (New York,
2005).
3 On ‘the Anglosphere’ see Richard J. Aldrich and John Kasuku, ‘Escaping from the Anglosphere:
culture, ethnocentrism and the Anglosphere’, International Affairs, 88/5 (2012), pp. 1009–28.
312 THROUGH A GLASS, DARKLY
© 2015 The Author. History published by The Historical Association and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
machine shaping the past in its own image’.4 This having been said,
movements emerged on either side of the Atlantic to challenge the
prevailing ‘top-down’ bias, whether in terms of E. P. Thompson’s
attempt to rescue those who have traditionally been ignored by histori-
ans from the ‘enormous condescension of posterity’,5 or Studs Terkel’s
numerous interventions to celebrate the lives of the ‘uncelebrated’.6
While intelligence history largely grew out of the ‘top-down’ tradition,
much academic oral history grew out of this ‘history from below’
approach and attempted to give a voice to the substantial groups of
people who had hitherto been ignored, such as women, ethnic and racial
minorities, the working class, the poor, and LGBT communities.7
Whereas intelligence history was informed by political and diplomatic
history and ties to the governmental elite, oral history was informed by
social and labour history and a much more distant relationship to
constellations of state power;8 whereas the former was driven by the
elusive and elliptical quest for the written word, the latter was driven by
a profusion of neglected voices; and finally, whereas the former sought
epistemic transcendence in the ‘smoking gun’ insider document, the
latter sought it in the voice of the ultimate outsider.
This article will draw upon state-of-the-art debates in oral history and
intelligence history; yet ultimately it will suggest ways in which we may
go beyond the extant scholarship. As the UK Parliament and US Senate
Oral History Projects make clear, oral history has never been the pre-
serve of those ‘hidden from history’.9 The CIA also has its own (albeit
largely in-house) Oral History Program. The aforementioned notwith-
standing, many of these ‘top-down’ programmes have largely seen oral
history as an adjunct to the more ‘scientifically’ legitimated documen-
tary record; a softer supplementary source to bring those areas of dif-
fusion around the keyhole’s edge into comparatively sharper focus. In
other words: oral history has served as a way to finesse ‘the great
recording machine’. These manoeuvres, however, do not exhaust the
potential of oral history. In fact, in some ways they merely stand as a
testament to its obfuscation. A particularly narrow and fact-centric
reading of oral history is ‘added and stirred’ to a set of pre-existing ideas
4 Paul Thompson, The Voice of the Past: Oral History, 3rd edn (Oxford, 2000), p. 4.
5 E. P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (London, 1963), p. 12.
6 Studs Terkel, Hard Times: An Oral History of the Great Depression (New York, 1970); Working:
People Talk about What They Do All Day and How They Feel About What They Do (New York,
1974); ‘The Good War’: An Oral History of World War II (New York, 1984).
7 See for example: Elizabeth Roberts, AWoman’s Place: An Oral History of Working Class Women
1890–1940 (Oxford, 1995); Alessandro Portelli, They Say in Harlan County: An Oral History (New
York, 2011); Elizabeth Lapovsky Kennedy and Madeline D. Davis (eds), Boots of Leather, Slippers
of Gold: The History of a Lesbian Community (New York, 1993).
8 The original aim of the British-based Oral History Society was to focus on ‘those sections of
society who are unlikely to leave behind them any quantity of memoirs, diaries, or correspondence
from which history can subsequently be written’. Anthony Seldon, By Word of Mouth: Elite Oral
History (London, 1983), p. 10.
9 See n. 8.
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surrounding what constitutes ‘good research’ – an exercise which leaves
intact a highly circumscribed notion of what types of questions may
legitimately be asked and what types of answers may legitimately be
given.
This article submits that some of the keenest insights from oral
history theory and methodology lie in allowing to us to explore a
broader range of research questions. This is especially true with refer-
ence to questions surrounding identity and culture, as well as those that
consider meaning, memory and narrative. As one of the field’s foremost
theorists and practitioners Alessandro Portelli points out in ‘The Pecu-
liarities of Oral History’: ‘Subjectivity is just as much the business of
history as the more visible “facts”. What the informant believes is
indeed a historical fact (that is, the fact that he or she believes it) just as
much as what “really” happened.’10 Of course, and this should be
stressed right here at the outset, this is not to suggest that facts are not
important, or that they do not exist – it is to suggest that history
encompasses more than them. In a somewhat different context, allow a
quote from a speech given by Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and
history buff Bill Casey in the same year as Portelli’s paper, 1981, to
underscore the point: ‘facts can confuse . . . just as houses are made of
a pile of stones . . . a pile of stones is not a house.’11 All of this, then,
gives us a fuller and more expansive picture of the world of intelligence,
or to restate this through the metaphor with which we began, it allows
us to peer into more keyholes.
By way of this analysis, this article will firstly outline some of the
problems encountered in studying intelligence services such as the CIA.
It does so by relating them to the author’s own research. It secondly
considers some of the issues historians must confront when applying
oral history to the study of the CIA, once again reflecting on the
author’s own experiences interviewing CIA officers while a British
Research Council Library of Congress Fellow in Washington DC in
2011. Finally, it outlines some of the contributions oral history can
make towards a better understanding of intelligence history and the
CIA in particular.
A number of problems face the historian who wishes to turn his or
her gaze to the field of intelligence history. To bring this within the
sphere of cognition of the reader, consider the research project the
author recently undertook, an experience that directly led to this
attempt to think more systematically about the links between oral
history and intelligence history. Struggles for Freedom: Afghanistan and
US Foreign Policy, among other things, examined the CIA’s role in US
10 Alessandro Portelli, ‘The peculiarities of oral history’, History Workshop Journal, 12 (1981)
pp. 96–107, at p. 100. Emphasis in original.
11 ‘Department of State Executive Seminar in National and International Affairs – Washington
D.C.’, 6 May 1981, William J. Casey Papers, 1928–1996, Box 557, Folder 4, Hoover Institution
Archives.
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foreign policy towards that country since the Carter administration,
particularly since the Soviet invasion of that country on Christmas Day
1979. This was an event that Carter described in his January 1980 State
of the Union Address to a Joint Session of the Congress as a ‘radical
and aggressive new step’ that ‘could pose the most serious threat to the
peace since the Second World War’.12 In private, he had outlined it in
stark terms in a letter to British prime minister Margaret Thatcher not
long beforehand: ‘because of the broad stakes the West in general
has in the region’s stability and the flow of oil . . . the challenge to
our common and crucial interests in this region is unprecedented’.13
Former president Nixon on the other hand was less measured and
prosaic, informing readers in his cri de coeur published not long after
the invasion, The Real War, that: ‘We awake to find that a region once
celebrated largely in romantic fantasy holds the fate of the world in its
hands.’14 ‘Basically’, notes Carter’s National Security Advisor Zbigniew
Brzezinski (1977–81), ‘it was the first time in the entire Cold War that
the Soviet Union overtly used military force to effect a significant geo-
political change and to do so in a region where there were significant
American interests involved.’15
On the back of the Church and Pike Committee investigations of the
mid-1970s, Carter had come to office promising to control and clean up
the CIA. ‘The Carter administration’, argued executive assistant to
Carter’s DCI Stansfield Turner, ‘from the top down – except for
Brzezinski – arrived in Washington suspicious and distrustful of the
CIA.’16 Carter’s running mate Walter Mondale had been a member of
the Church Committee; Deputy National Security Advisor David
12 Jimmy Carter, ‘A State of the Union Address Delivered before a Joint Session of the Congress’,
The American Presidency Project, 23 Jan. 1980, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=33079>
[accessed 17 Aug. 2014].
13 ‘President Carter to Prime Minister Thatcher – Letter from President to Prime Minister on
Afghanistan’, 10 Jan. 1980, ‘Afghanistan, 1–2/80’ folder, Box 1, NSA – Brzezinski Material, Jimmy
Carter Library. These sentiments were shared by President Johnson’s former National Security
Advisor W. W. Rostow (1966–9), who in a letter to Carter that perhaps fed into his State of the
Union Address suggested that: ‘the impulse to convert their hardware and logistical advantages
into direct control over Middle East oil must be considerable . . . the impulse certainly represents
the greatest threat of a Third World War since 1945’. ‘Letter from W. W. Rostow to President
Carter’, 7 Jan. 1979, ‘President’s File of Input for 1980 State of the Union Address, 1/23/80’ folder,
Box 166, Office of Staff Secretary – Handwriting File, Jimmy Carter Library. In administration
memoranda it was alternatively called ‘a major watershed’, ‘an event of major political and
strategic significance’, and ‘an extremely ominous precedent’. See: ‘Michael Oksenberg to Zbigniew
Brzezinski – Afghanistan’, 28 Dec. 1979, ‘Afghanistan, 4–12/79’ folder, Box 1, NSA – Brzezinski
Material, Jimmy Carter Library; ‘Stephen Larabee to Zbigniew Brzezinski – Soviet Intervention in
Afghanistan’, 31 Dec. 1979, ‘Afghanistan, 4–12/79’ folder, Box 1, NSA – Brzezinski Material,
Jimmy Carter Library; ‘Marshall Brement and Thomas Thornton to David Aaron – Requested
Remarks to Methodist Bishops and NY State Community Leaders’, 8 Jan. 1980, ‘Afghanistan,
1–2/80’ folder, Box 1, NSA– Brzezinski Material, Jimmy Carter Library.
14 Richard Nixon, The Real War (New York, 1980), p. 71.
15 Zbigniew Brzezinski, telephone interview with author, Washington DC, 23 Sept. 2011.
16 Robert Gates, From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Story of Five Presidents and How They
Won the Cold War (New York, 1996), p. 136.
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Aaron and Brzezinski’s executive assistant Karl Inderfurth had also
been on the staff of that committee.17 Turner himself, meanwhile,
according to Robert Gates, was regarded with ‘deep hostility and dislike
by many in and out of the Agency and intelligence community’.18
Although the commentary and historiography surrounding the Carter
administration and that of his successor Reagan is highly politicized,
debates and controversies that will continue for many years to come,
Gates also notes that the aforementioned points notwithstanding and
contrary to the ‘conventional wisdom, the Carter administration turned
almost from the outset to CIA to carry out covert actions’.19 During the
course of the administration, then, it could be argued that the disjunc-
ture between Carter’s public and private stance with regards to the CIA
came into increasing alignment. Despite having complained ‘with what
security are we to mount even the most routine clandestine activity
when the law requires that eight committees. Some 180 congressmen,
and almost as many staff members be informed in advance?’, New York
Senator Daniel P. Moynihan had also remarked approvingly that
‘Carter has now discovered that it is his CIA!’.20 Indeed, as the admin-
istration went on ‘Carter leaned more and more heavily on the CIA and
covert action.’21
The most salient example of covert action during the Carter presi-
dency, perhaps even in CIA history, was Afghanistan. Operation
Cyclone, the code name for the CIA’s routing of money and matériel to
the mujahedeen during this final stage of the Cold War, went on under
Reagan to become the longest and largest covert operation in Agency
history. Indeed, the author ventures that the reader would be surprised
by just how broad and deep the links are between the CIA, Afghanistan,
and US foreign policy. The focus of a separate though related research
paper,22 here it suffices to say that if Afghanistan was woven into the
mythology surrounding the Cold War’s termination, it is intimately
involved in the gestation, birth and life-cycle of the Global War on
17 Jeffreys-Jones, The CIA and American Democracy, p. 216.
18 Gates, From the Shadows, p. 136. A ‘hawk’s hawk’ within the administration, Military Advisor
to the National Security Advisor (1977–81) William E. Odom (a future head of the US National
Security Agency, 1985–8), would uncharitably describe the DCI thus: ‘Turner is truly dense. He is
cagey at times, but for the job he has and the resources he could develop, very little of value comes
from him.’ As for Turner’s Deputy Director (a future National Security Advisor, 1986–7 and
Secretary of Defense, 1987–9): ‘[Frank] Carlucci is a careful and unimaginative bureaucrat. His
greatest talent is surviving a Nixon hatchet man previously, now he tries to stay in step with David
Aaron and that network.’ While not wishing to reduce Turner and Carlucci to Odom’s character-
ization, it nevertheless underlines the fact that there were different types of perspective within the
Carter administration. William E. Odom, ‘22 November 1979’, Box 7, William E. Odom Papers,
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington DC.
19 Gates, From the Shadows, p. 142.
20 ‘Letter from Daniel P. Moynihan to President Carter’, 10 Jan. 1980, ‘President’s File of Input
for 1980 State of the Union Address, 1/23/80’ folder, Box 166, Office of Staff Secretary – Hand-
writing File, Jimmy Carter Library; Jeffreys-Jones, The CIA and American Democracy, p. 226.
21 Gates, From the Shadows, p. 155.
22 Andrew Hammond, ‘Afghanistan, the CIA, and US foreign policy since 1979’.
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Terror. The war in Afghanistan, let us not forget, went on to displace
Vietnam as the longest war in US history under George W. Bush and
Obama.
Nonetheless, taking this case as an example, what problems do we
face in researching intelligence history? To begin, let us consider a
sample of some of the titles of pertinent books in the secondary litera-
ture that a library search might lead you to: For the Presidents Eyes
Only, by Christopher Andrew; The Main Enemy: The Inside Story of the
CIA’s Final Showdown with the KGB, by Milt Bearden and James Risen;
Ghost Wars, by Steve Coll; Executive Secrets: Covert Action and the
Presidency, by William Daugherty; From The Shadows: The Ultimate
Insider’s Story of Five Presidents and How they Won the Cold War, by
Robert Gates; The CIA at War: The Secret Campaign against Terror,
by Ronald Kessler; Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA, by
John Prados; Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981–1987, by Bob
Woodward; and State of War: The Secret History of the CIA and the
Bush Administration, by James Risen.23
Immediately it is apparent through terms like ‘ghost’ and ‘shadows’
that we are dealing with a clandestine netherworld where things are not
quite as they seem. It is a world of ‘secrets’ and ‘secrecy’ – ‘secret
history’, ‘secret campaign’, ‘secret wars’ – and a world where informa-
tion is restricted to those on the ‘inside’ who may or who may not deem
it information they can tell and, what is more, can tell to us – although
we can of course try to penetrate this world by alternative means (of
which more below). Indeed, ‘insiderism’, for wont of a better phrase, is
one of its defining features – taken to its logical limit of course by the
sacrosanct phrase ‘for the president’s eyes only’. Popular cultural prod-
ucts on the world of intelligence also draw us to the type of space in
which these agencies operate, a space which is not completely confined
to the cultural imaginary; 2008 alone, for example, saw the release of the
following films: Body of Lies, Burn After Reading and Nothing But the
Truth.24
Alternatively and more concretely, consider some other books on
intelligence, such as: The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War
Secret Intelligence, by Richard J. Aldrich; Spy Wars: Moles, Mysteries,
23 Christopher Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presi-
dency from Washington to Bush (London, 1995); Milt Bearden and James Risen, The Main Enemy:
The Inside Story of the CIA’s Final Showdown with the KGB (New York, 2004); Steve Coll, Ghost
Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden From the Soviet Invasion to
September 10, 2001 (London, 2005); William Daugherty, Executive Secrets: Covert Action and the
Presidency (Lexington, KY, 2008); Gates, From The Shadows; Ronald Kessler, The CIA at War:
The Secret Campaign against Terror (New York, 2004); John Prados, Safe for Democracy: The
Secret Wars of the CIA (Chicago, 2004); Bob Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA,
1981–1987 (New York, 2005); James Risen, The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Adminis-
tration (London, 2007).
24 Ridley Scott (director), Body of Lies (Los Angeles, 2008); Ethan and Joel Cohen (directors),
Burn after Reading (Los Angeles, 2008); Rod Lurie (director), Nothing but the Truth (Los Angeles,
2008).
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and Deadly Games, by Tennent H. Bagley; In the Sleep Room: The Story
of the CIA Brainwashing Experiments in Canada, by Anne Collins; The
Game Player: Confessions of the CIA’s Original Political Operative, by
Miles Copeland; Classified: Secrecy and the State in Modern Britain, by
Christopher Moran; Honourable Treachery: A History of U.S. Intelli-
gence, Espionage, and Covert Action from the American Revolution to the
CIA, by George J. A. O’Toole; Gatekeeper: Memoirs of a CIA Poly-
graph Examiner, by John F. Sullivan; The Missing Dimension: Govern-
ments and Intelligence Communities in the 20th Century, edited by
Christopher Andrew and David Dilks; Deadly Deceits: My Twenty-Five
Years in the CIA, by Ralph McGehee; and, A Look Over My Shoulder,
by Richard Helms.25 Terms like ‘hidden’, ‘mysteries’, ‘brainwashing’,
‘game’, ‘classified’, ‘treachery’, ‘gatekeeper’, and phrases such as
‘missing dimension’, ‘deadly deceits’ and ‘look over my shoulder’,
underscore the point. Certainly, some of this can be put down to over-
zealous publishers, editors and authors keen to shift copies of their
respective books. Nonetheless, this may be a necessary condition when
considering the way these titles are so named, but it is not by any means
sufficient. In fact, that these titles would be deemed more marketable
and alluring to their respective audiences – to peek behind the curtain,
to look through the forbidden keyhole – is in and of itself an interesting
point.
Most importantly, however, we have to consider the very nature of
these institutions. The CIA, for example, defines its ‘mission’ thus:
‘Preempt threats and further US national security objectives by collect-
ing intelligence that matters, producing objective all-source analysis,
conducting effective covert action as directed by the President, and
safeguarding the secrets that help keep our Nation safe.’26 The clandes-
tine arm of the CIA, meanwhile, defines its own ‘mission’ as follows:
‘The mission of the National Clandestine Service (NCS) is to strengthen
national security and foreign policy objectives through the clandestine
collection of human intelligence (HUMINT) and Covert Action.’27 The
life and well-being of the nation, then, is enmeshed and entwined in this
institution’s ability to procure information and secrets and to safeguard
25 Aldrich, The Hidden Hand; Tennent H. Bagley, Spy Wars: Moles, Mysteries, and Deadly Games
(New Haven, 2008); Anne Collins, In the Sleep Room: The Story of the CIA Brainwashing Experi-
ments in Canada (Toronto, 1988); Miles Copeland, The Game Player: Confessions of the CIA’s
Original Political Operative (London, 1989); Christopher Moran, Classified: Secrecy and the State
in Modern Britain (Cambridge, 2012); O’Toole, Honourable Treachery; John F. Sullivan, Gate-
keeper: Memoirs of a CIA Polygraph Examiner (Washington DC, 2008); Christopher Andrew and
David Dilks (eds), The Missing Dimension: Governments and Intelligence Communities in the 20th
Century (London, 1984); Ralph McGehee, Deadly Deceits: My Twenty-Five Years in the CIA (New
York, 1984); Richard Helms and William Hood, A Look Over My Shoulder: Life in the Central
Intelligence Agency (New York, 2003).
26 ‘CIA Mission, Vision, Ethos and Challenges’, CIA, 4 April 2007, <https://www.cia.gov/about
-cia/cia-vision-mission-values> [accessed 15 Sept. 2014].
27 ‘Offices of CIA – National Clandestine Service’, CIA, 23 March 2009, <https://www.cia.gov/
offices-of-cia/clandestine-service/our-mission.html> [accessed 15 Sept. 2014].
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its own in turn.28 It should be said at this point that when considered
alongside other intelligence services the CIA is in fact comparatively
open. Former DCI John McCone (1961–5), who oversaw the CIA
during a particularly notable period that included the Cuban Missile
Crisis, would complain to Casey in 1984 for example:
It is of great interest to me that of the thirty-five nations who maintain a
foreign intelligence service – only two, the United States and West
Germany, admit the existence of their foreign intelligence organizations.
France does not, Great Britain does not, Japan does not, Israel does not,
Egypt does not, and the Soviets have not admitted that the KGB is a
foreign intelligence service.29
We also heard Moynihan complain above about the tension between
secrecy and congressional oversight. In a recent article in Intelligence
and National Security, meanwhile, CIA staff historian Nicholas
Dujmovic opined that: ‘The wealth of material available on the CIA
website, I believe, is unique for any intelligence organization in history
in terms of its volume, quantity and exposure of previously held
secrets.’30 In the UK, on the other hand, attitudes towards intelligence,
as one scholar has recently reminded us, mirrored those which the
British had towards sex – that is it went on, but it was considered
jolly indecent to bring it up (the existence of the Secret Intelligence
Service (MI6) was not officially confirmed until the passage of
the Intelligence Services Act in 1994).31
Nevertheless, all of this is of course a matter of degrees. The CIA’s
‘ethos’ underlines secrecy’s inviolable status in uncharacteristically
melodramatic terms: ‘we preserve our ability to obtain secrets by pro-
tecting sources and methods from the moment we enter on duty until
our last breath.’32 Dujmovic also points out in the same article that:
‘intelligence historians face particular challenges in making sense of
what too often is history deliberately shrouded.’ CIA staff historians, on
the other hand, ‘operate mostly in the secret world’.33 Even the ‘Kid’s
28 For a discussion about the shifting relationship between information and secrets see: Gregory F.
Treverton, Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information (New York, 2003). The British
Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), meanwhile, describes how ‘Intelligence is at the heart of what
MI6 does. It is the secret information that the British government requires to keep the country safe
and prosperous’. ‘Secret Intelligence Service – Intelligence Officers’, SIS, <https://www.sis.gov.uk/
careers/roles/intelligence-officers.html> [accessed 14 Sept. 2014].
29 ‘Letter from John A. McCone to William J. Casey’, 10 May 1984, William J. Casey Papers,
1928–96, Box 81, Folder 14, Hoover Institution Archives.
30 Nicholas Dujmovic, ‘Getting CIA history right: The informal partnership between agency
historians and outside scholars’, Intelligence and National Security, 26/2–3 (2011), pp. 228–45, at
p. 234.
31 As Christopher Moran points out, ‘Throughout much of the 20th century, the UK intelligence
community was the “invisible man” of government, a state within a state, and an entity about
which questions were never asked, even in parliament’ (Christopher Moran, ‘The pursuit of
intelligence history: methods, sources, and trajectories in the United Kingdom’, Studies in Intelli-
gence, 55/2 (2011), pp. 33–55, at p. 34).
32 ‘CIA Mission, vision, Ethos and Challenges’ (see above n. 25).
33 Dujmovic, ‘Getting CIA history right’, p. 228.
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Zone’ of the CIA website promises children that they will ‘see some top
secret things you won’t find anywhere else’.34 In other words, secrecy
and differential access to information is a core part of this institution’s
very raison d’etre.35
For the researcher, then, just how to we acquire information about
intelligence services and the CIA more particularly? The traditional first
port of call for the intelligence historian, of course, is the archive. For
the author’s study, a visit to, say, the Carter and Reagan libraries, The
National Archives, and a look at pertinent private papers such as Bill
Casey’s at the Hoover Institute or Congressman Charlie Wilson’s at the
East Texas Research Centre, would have been a good starting point in
seeking to understand the CIA’s role in US foreign policy towards
Afghanistan during the final stages of the Cold War – and indeed they
were. Nevertheless, the archival material on intelligence is spotty to say
the least, and a lack of documentary resources is often the major hurdle
to further research in the field. By luck, rather than any kind of fore-
sight of planning, the author, as far as he knows, was the first researcher
to look at Bill Casey’s papers at the Hoover Institute.36 Despite the
promise of being ‘the first’, the dream of many an archival historian, no
‘smoking gun’ was of course interned within. They were extremely
useful on multiple fronts, but much of the material I sought was not
available for researchers. The same was true at the National Archives
and the Reagan Library, with redact sheet after redact sheet ensconced
within the boxes most likely to yield material directly pertaining to US
foreign policy in Afghanistan and the CIA’s mission in particular.
Secrecy and the very nature of these institutions, then, militate
against a full picture of the documentary record – this is true even when
compared to other departments and institutions of state. As Mark
Lowenthal points out, intelligence is different from other government
functions: ‘Intelligence exists because governments seek to hide some
information from other governments, who, in turn, seek to discover
hidden information by means which they wish to keep secret.’37 Another
34 ‘CIA Kid’s Zone’, CIA, 12 April 2007, <https://www.cia.gov/kids-page> [accessed 10 Oct. 2014].
35 Michael Warner, in one popular understanding, defines intelligence as follows: ‘Intelligence is
secret, state activity to understand or influence foreign entities’. ‘In Want of a Definition –
Understanding our Craft’, CIA, 14 April 2007, <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-
of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol46no3/article02.html> [accessed 2 Oct. 2014].
Aldrich, meanwhile, argues that: ‘secret services are imperiled if they do not keep themselves
hidden. Without a track record of intense secrecy, future agents will refuse to work for them,
especially in countries where memories are long and allegiances are traced over generations. For
the purposes of recruitment of agents, secret services know that a reputation for extreme secrecy
is one of the most potent instruments in their armory’. Richard J. Aldrich, ‘Policing the past:
official history, secrecy and British intelligence since 1945’, English Historical Review, 119/483
(2004), pp. 922–53, at p. 953.
36 Serendipitously, he arrived at Hoover that very morning and asked about Casey’s papers on the
off-chance, fully expecting the answer still to be ‘we are waiting for permission from the family
to open them’, yet was told that they had been opened an hour or so beforehand.
37 Mark Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (London, 2012), p. 1.
320 THROUGH A GLASS, DARKLY
© 2015 The Author. History published by The Historical Association and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
scholar, meanwhile, reminds us that in virtually no other field does the
state pay as much attention to what material is released – the material
we want always seems tantalizingly just beyond our reach.38 Some mate-
rial on the Cuban Missile Crisis, an event which occurred over fifty
years ago, for example, remains classified to this day; while within the
Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series progress on incor-
porating CIA activities remains ‘qualified, uneven, and painfully slow’.39
If, therefore, the entrance to the CIA’s Old Headquarters Building is
inscribed with the following words from scripture ‘and ye shall know the
truth and the truth shall set you free’, how can historians of intelligence
come to share these sentiments? And if the motto of the NCS is
‘Veritatum cognoscere’ (to know the truth), just how do we access it? We
can wait patiently, of course, hoping that the mosaic of secret state
activity will gradually be illuminated. Nevertheless, as Richard Aldrich
points out, the past is sanitized, policed and laundered – intelligence
historians are routinely offered up a ‘pre-selected menu’ in ‘the history
supermarket’, a practice that can result in a culture of ‘release-
dependency’.40 Declassification, what is more, can be as much a process
of risk management and public diplomacy as transparency and
accountability. Space precludes a discussion over the political and epis-
temological status of ‘official histories’; nonetheless, they are hardly
comprehensive in terms of subject matter. They also lack an indispens-
able part of that scholarly apparatus upon which historians are weaned,
i.e. footnotes where we can apply Reagan’s dictum: ‘trust but verify’.41
In sum, with regard to intelligence history, there are fewer keyholes here
than in any other wing of the architecture of state and those which we
can see through have hardly the most illuminated backdrop.
If the archival record is problematic vis-à-vis the study of intelligence,
the nature of these institutions to a large extent prohibits scholars from
other fields applying their tools and techniques to the study of the
subject. If historians must wrestle with a fragmentary and opaque
documentary record – interestingly, the very nature of this enterprise
means that historians are kept just far enough away from the inner
working of the institution, yet just close enough in terms of release
dependency – the CIA as an institution is hardly conducive to
38 Richard J. Aldrich, ‘Persuasion? British intelligence, the history policeman, and official infor-
mation’, in Patrick Major and Christopher R. Moran (eds), Spooked: Empire and Intelligence Since
1945 (Newcastle, 2009), pp. 29–50, at p. 32.
39 Matthew Jones and Paul McGarr, ‘Real substance, not just symbolism? The CIA and the
representation of covert action in the FRUS series’, in Moran and Murphy (eds), Intelligence
Studies in Britain and the United States, pp. 65–89, at p. 82.
40 See Richard J. Aldrich, ‘Grow your own: Cold War intelligence and history supermarkets’,
Intelligence and National Security, 17/1 (2002), pp. 135–52, at p. 135. See also Aldrich, ‘Policing the
past’, pp. 922–53.
41 Basil Liddell Hart famously described the official British history of the First World War as
‘official but not history’. For an interesting discussion see Christopher Baxter and Keith Jeffrey,
‘Intelligence and “official history” ’, in Moran and Murphy (eds), Intelligence Studies in Britain and
the United States, pp. 289–303.
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ethnographic approaches, participant observation, surveys, question-
naires, focus groups, and so forth.
‘A specter is haunting the halls of the Academy’, wrote Portelli back
in 1981, ‘the specter of “oral history”.’42 This brings us back to history
and to the historian. If the study of intelligence services is inherently
problematic via the documentary record – which of course is something
very different from saying that we should abandon the task altogether,
and a look at the some of the footnotes above betrays the fact that the
author for one has not abandoned that task – then we must consider
what other means are at our disposal. This brings us in turn back to
Portelli’s spectre. If intelligence history, as Moran and Murphy suggest,
has been characterized by ‘hardcore empiricism’,43 then it has by and
large merely transferred that bent onto the conceptually diverse and
theoretically dynamic sub-field of oral history; a field that has presented
a challenge to the historical establishment since at least as far back as
the days when A. J. P. Taylor is reputed to have dismissed it as ‘old men
drooling about their youth’. Indeed, it could be argued that many of the
‘top-down’ oral history programmes, to pick up on a point made above,
have made quite an effort to do just that in their attempt to finesse ‘the
great recording machine’.
At this juncture, it is useful to consider some of the standard critiques
of oral history, but more importantly to think through some of the
challenges we may face in utilizing it to study the intelligence history.
The standard objections are well known. Oral history is trivial com-
pared to the ‘great man’ approach; it is inferior to the written word;
interviewing is the business of social scientists rather than historians;
human memory is often faulty and unreliable, prone to the crustaceans
of time; oral history interviews are unrepresentative, the results
ungeneralizable; the questioning may be biased; and so forth. Oral
historians have expended considerable intellectual labour in developing
their responses to these charges and in refining their methodology for
interpreting oral evidence. Space precludes a thorough treatment, here it
is suffice to say that an equal number of criticisms can of course be
extended towards archival materials and that much of the criticism
derives from a particularly narrow reading of not only what sources can
be used, but what they can be used for. We shall come back to this point
below.
Nonetheless, what problems do we encounter when applying oral
history to the field of intelligence more particularly? The immediate
problem, of course is just how do we locate and recruit our interviewees?
42 Portelli, ‘The peculiarities of oral history’, p. 96. Thompson also speaks to this theme: ‘The older
generation of historians who hold the chairs and the purse strings are instinctively apprehensive
about the advent of a new method. It implies that they are no longer in command of the techniques
of their profession’ (Thompson, The Voice of the Past, p. 81).
43 Christopher Moran and Christopher Murphy, ‘Introduction: intelligence studies then and now’,
in Moran and Murphy (eds), Intelligence Studies in Britain and the United States, pp. 1–15, at p. 3.
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Providence has not been so kind to those wishing to undertake oral
history interviews (or for that matter to rival intelligence services),
whereby we can look up the Yellow Pages between ‘ci’ and ‘cib’ and find
‘cia’ with a list of intelligence operatives and CIA employees, perhaps
with those who worked on Operation Cyclone, Afghanistan, or in the
Directorate of Operations Near East and South Asia Division sepa-
rately classified for our convenience. You will find no deputy directors,
division chiefs, station chiefs or CIA officers seconded to the National
Security Council there. When we eventually procure names, moreover,
we have to contend with the very nature of the CIA as an institution:
knowledge is compartmentalized, there are silos of secrecy; information
is often shared on a need-to-know basis; many people do not want to
share what they know, or may only do so if you work for an outlet such
as the Washington Post or the New York Times; there may be issues you
wish to know about for which they are sworn to secrecy, and so forth.
With some hard research, not anything beyond the capability of any
historian worth his or her salt, however, the author did nonetheless find
some people who were willing to speak to him and who had very
interesting and illuminating things to say with regard to the aforemen-
tioned research project (the ‘smoking gun’ of course remained illusory).
Indeed, many of these interviewees proved willing to furnish the author
with further contacts and introductions (‘snowball sampling’); he also
found that by interviewing enough former US foreign service officers
(especially career South Asia hands) he would quite often be pointed in
the direction of an Agency figure with whom they had worked in the
relevant theatre.
When the interview commences, meanwhile, another question springs
to mind (and it is one which anyone who has ever interviewed someone
who has worked for the intelligence services has been asked): how do
you know you are not being misled or lied to? The author was asked this
very question after a presentation for a job interview several years back.
‘These people are professional liars, how can you trust what they say?’44
They are skilled at charming people, the line of questioning would
continue during the lunch break, at lighting a room up with personal
magnetism; they are experts in psychological seduction, trained to
mislead, to deceive, to provide cover stories, to hide things; they are
skilled in subversion and covert operations; they are just as likely to
subvert the historical record as anything else. The world they inhabit,
then, is one of information, misinformation and disinformation, of pro-
paganda, manipulation and – as the character loosely based on former
DCI Allen Dulles from The Good Shepherd termed them – ‘the black
arts’. While one of the criticisms that can be levelled against oral history
concerns the extent to which the interviewer can ventriloquize the inter-
44 Think of titles of the following two books on the ‘cultural Cold War’: Frances Stoner Saunders,
Who Paid the Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War (London, 1999); Hugh Wilford, The
Mighty Wurlitzer: How the CIA Played America (London, 2008).
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viewee (i.e. lead him or her in a certain direction and speak their voice
through them), with regard to an intelligence officer the fear is that it
will in fact be the interviewer who will be ventriloquized. In retrospect
the author is glad that he was asked the question, as it forced him to
think hard about the issue, an experience that was yet another factor
which fed into the writing of this article.
A function of this article is to draw attention to the fact that, with
regard to checking the veracity of any factual statements made, just
because we must mark the map ‘here be dragons’ does not mean that we
must abandon the voyage entirely, provided, of course, we have taken
the requisite precautions. Concerning issues of fact, then, we must ‘trust
but verify’ both the source and the information (or perhaps, with regard
to intelligence officers, we should rather say, ‘do not trust, seek to
verify’). To what extent, we must ask, can the information be triangu-
lated or corroborated?45 If it cannot, then the obligatory qualifications
must of course be drawn. We must also ask to what extent is there an
institutional bias embedded in their testimony. Are they merely score-
settling, axe-grinding, legacy-building or attempting to rewrite history?
To what extent have we pulled our punches through not wanting to
upset our interviewees, to remain in their good graces or to keep that
door open for future research? These are all standard interviewer–
interviewee questions and research dynamics. Obviously, they must be
handled carefully; however, provided we go through standard operating
procedures with regard to interviews, I think we must remember what
the leading oral historian of his generation, Studs Terkel, famously said
with regard to what should be on his epitaph: ‘curiosity never killed the
cat’. As with anything else, experience and training can go a long way.
To be sure, oral history can be expensive, time-consuming and frustrat-
ing: but then so can archival research. We must also remember that even
though the author mainly interviewed individuals from the NCS, and
the cultural imaginary notwithstanding, not every member of the CIA is
skilled in the ‘black arts’ or even seeking to utilize them. The interviews
the author conducted were invaluable in helping him understand this
issue in a much deeper way and in a way that reading documents simply
could not; the interviews also informed subsequent archival research
and interviews in a virtuous recursive circle.
Furthermore, oral history should not merely be seen as a means by
which to ‘grow your own’ factual material, although it is that indeed:
the author would amplify Richard Aldrich’s exhortation for historians –
who have often appeared ‘feeble supplicants before the state’ – to do
so.46 Oral history, to be sure, should not be limited to a fact-generating
vehicle for the machinery and institutions of state; it can also help
intelligence history – a field often associated with narrow realist
45 See Philip H. J. Davies, ‘Spies as informants: triangulation and the interpretation of elite
interview data in the study of the intelligence and security services’, Politics, 21/1 (2001), pp. 73–80.
46 See Aldrich, ‘Grow your own’, p. 148.
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approaches to history and world politics – explore a broader range of
research questions. It can also facilitate, to be sure, a livelier discussion
surrounding a reconsideration of the field’s boundaries. Indeed, one of
the areas in which oral history has come into its own is in exploring
questions of cultural meaning – a broader debate within history and the
human sciences more generally which has as of yet hardly permeated
intelligence history’s core.47 Memory, for example, is more than a
‘passive repository of facts’, although it can and does yield facts not
generated anywhere else, but it is also an ‘active process in the creation
of meanings’.48 In other words, let us not only ask what people did, but
‘what they wanted to do, what they believed they were doing, what they
now think they did’.49 Even if Operation Cyclone did or did not ‘give the
Soviet Union its Vietnam’, as has been suggested to the author, the fact
that this was what several CIA officers from the period wanted to do,
what they believed they were doing, what they now think about what
they did is itself of immense interest; as are the ways in which they
conceptualized the CIA mission and US national identity in the late
1970s and early 1980s; as are the ways in which they believe that during
the course of their careers they have been fighting ‘freedom’s’ fight.
While work has been done in intelligence history that explores culture or
that utilizes interview techniques, the results, as was mentioned above,
have quite often merely been ‘added and stirred’ to a pre-existing
ethos of ‘hardcore empiricism’; cultural sources and interviews have
been used to provide literary flourishes and sparkles, to sketch vignettes
that keep the reader interested, to supplement the dry and dusty docu-
mentary record. Subsequently, much of oral history’s promise has been
domesticated and rendered inert within a field with a pronounced mate-
rialist bias that, as Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones points out, feeds on a ‘feeling
of being unappreciated’, which results in an exaggeration of its own
importance.50
The point here is not to get into a ‘method x is better than method y’
style of argument, but to recognize that there is no holy grail with
regard to research methods, merely a series of analytical trade-offs that
every researcher who studies the social world must – consciously or
unconsciously – make. Part of the purpose of this article is to make a
contribution to the field by outlining ways in which intelligence histo-
rians can be more reflexive and question what has passed for ‘common-
sense’ in the field for too long. Like weight-lifters who say they have no
time to take a step back and rethink their approach to working out as
47 See John Tosh, The Pursuit of History, 3rd edn (London, 2000), esp. pp. 193–210.
48 Alessandro Portelli, ‘What makes oral history different?’, in Robert Perks and Alasdair
Thompson (eds), The Oral History Reader (London, 1998), pp. 63–74, at p. 69.
49 Portelli, ‘The peculiarities of oral history’, pp. 99–100 (my emphasis). See also, Alasdair
Thompson, ‘Memory and remembering in oral history’, in Donald A. Ritchie (ed.), The Oxford
Handbook of Oral History (Oxford, 2011), pp. 77–95.
50 Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, ‘Preface’, in Moran and Murphy (eds), Intelligence Studies in Britain and
the United States, pp. xv–xviii, at p. xvi.
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they are ‘too busy working-out’, intelligence historians, as the editors of
one recent volume remind us, must think more deeply about the body of
work they have constructed and how they have constructed it,51 as well
as considering how to take the field forward into the future and engage
with broader debates within the historical profession and the human
sciences. A more substantive understanding of oral history and culture,
I would submit, is intelligence history’s new ‘missing dimension’ and
would mark its further maturation as a field of scholarly endeavour. As
with archival research in the field of intelligence, the problems any
budding oral history interviewer will face in the field are especially
pronounced. We will often see through a glass, darkly; although
meeting face to face we will know at least a little bit more in part. This
may not be ideal (what research circumstances ever are?), but intelli-
gence institutions such as the CIA are such an essential part of the
modern state machinery and so critical to history and politics that the
author for one wants to peer through as many keyholes – however,
imperfectly – as he possibly can.
51 Moran and Murphy, ‘Introduction’, p. 3.
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